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East Timor 
The war is far from over, 
says Murdani 
General .Murdani now admits that resistance fighters and their 
supporters in the bush probably total about 10,000 people, and 
that they "never fight in one group ... (but) in splinters" (that is, 
mobile, small guerrilla units). This largely confirms the analysis of 
guerrilla strength worked out on the basis of information from 
inside East Timor before the commencement of the 1983 offensive 
(see Budiardjo and Liem, The War Against East Timor, Zed 
Books, 1984). 
At the time the offensive was launched, Murdani stated his 
objective as being: 
This time, no fooling around. We are going to hit them without mercy. 
If this call (for surrender) goes unheeded, the government will use its 
armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of Fretilin 
rebels. 
(The Age, Melbourne, 18 August 1983) 
But in an interview with Reuters on 17 December, Murdani 
admitted that the war could not be ended in one or two years. "I'm 
not saying there's no end in sight but it will take some time to 
resolve." Murdani also said that 
* Indonesian troops are being ambushed "once in a while", 
* "some of our weapons, ammo, gets into their hands", 
* Indonesia has 14 battalions of between 500 and 550 troops in 
East Timor with between 400 and 450 from each battalion 
doing line duty, 
* Air Force jets are carrying out bombing runs though this "did 
not happen regularly". 
Although the interview was given to a foreign news agency, it 
was clearly directed among others at critics within the Army who 
have become impatient with Murdani's inability to crush the 
resistance in East Timor despite all the blustering threats he has 
made. He concentrated on trying to explain why it was taking so 
long to defeat Fretilin and claimed, quoting (US) General 
Westmoreland's dictum, that Indonesia must struggle to win "the 
hearts and minds of the (East Timorese) people" . 
The Catholic Church in East Timor came in for its share of the 
blame for Murdani's failure on the battlefield. He complained that 
large-scale conventional warfare could not be launched (sic) for 
fear of "exacerbating religious differences between the Catholic 
Timorese and the predominantly Muslim troops". He accused the 
priests of "giving the people the wrong information" and 
suggested that the Church was upset because it could no longer 
play a part in the decision-making process as it had done under the 
Portuguese. What he didn't say was, that since the Indonesian 
invasion, the Church in East Timor had ceased being part of the 
establishment and had been "transformed into a people's Church, a 
transformation due largely to the extreme brutality of Indonesian 
rule. 
400 strategic villages being set up 
Four hundred desa binaan ("guided" or strategic villages) are 
being set up in East Timor and will be located "in areas which can 
be easily supervised and patrolled" . The Timorese puppet 
governor of the "province" of East Timor, Mario Carascalao, said 
this would allow the province to solve its security problems. He 
explained that the project was being managed jointly by the 
provincial government (under the control of the heavily-
militarised Department of the Interior) and the Armed Forces. 
A previous announcement about these villages spoke only of 
200 desa binaan (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 65, September 1984) 
and gave the villages their full name, desa binaan pangkal 
perlawanan ("guided villages as bases for resistance") . 
It is not yet clear whether this new style of population control 
simply means the reinforcement, on existing sites, of the so-called 
daerah pemukiman ("resettlement areas") into which almost the 
entire Timorese population was herded during and after the 
encirclement and annihilation campaign of 1977-79, or will be 
located on new sites, thus involving the wholesale removal of 
hundreds of thousands of people. 
A Sinar Harapan editorial (28 November 1984), commenting 
on the 400 new strategic villages, makes it clear that security 
restrictions are still very much in force throughout East Timor. 
Asserting that security disorders are under control in some parts, 
the paper suggests that in such regions, it was now time to lift 
security restrictions that were formerly needed but which can only 
obstruct people's participation (in development activity). This 
would make it possible to isolate those regions where Fretilin 
remnants still have their networks. In fact, the reconstructed 
villages are clearly designed to tighten security control, not loosen 
it, as Sinar Harapan recommends. They conform with standard 
counter-insurgency techniques employed in many other countries, 
Malaya, Vietnam, Guatemala and Rhodesia, to mention just a 
few. 
The new plans in East Timor are related to efforts by the 
military regime to intensify economic exploitation even while the 
war is still in progress. Last November, Indonesia's Capital 
Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM) announced that the 
territory has potentially large amounts of manganese, gold, 
marble, iron, coal and gas, a sure sign that domestic and foreign 
capital is being invited to invest in the region . 
East Timor 
Indonesia and Portugal secret talks 
Secret negotiations about the future of E ast Timor are now in 
progress between Indonesia and Portugal, increasing· the danger 
of a deal between the two countries behind the backs of the East 
Timorese people . This would enable the present and former 
colonial masters of East Timor to persuade the UN to drop the 
issue from the General Assembly agenda . 
The first round of negotiations lasting several days was held at 
the UN headquarters in New York in November . The second 
round was to have taken place in December but was postponed till 
January and scheduled to commence on the 11th. The UN 
Secretary-General's special deputy for East Timar affairs , the 
Pakistani diplomat, Achmed Rafeeuddin , attended the opening 
and closing sessions of the November round of talks. Portugal was 
represented by a three-man team, headed by Portugal's 
ambassador to the UN , Mr Rui Medina . On the Indonesian side, 
Alex Alatas, ambassador to the UN was accompanied by a person 
identified only as "Luis" , presumably a Timorese and described as 
"a diplomatic functionary from Jakarta" . 
The secret talks follow the consultations held under UN 
auspices over the past year or so , on the basis of the 1982 UN 
General Assembly resolution (37/30) which instructed the UN 
Secretary-General "to initiate consultations with all parties 
directly concerned with a view to exploring avenues for achieving 
a comprehensive settlement of the (East Timor) problem" . Like 
the earlier consultations, the present negotiations simply ignore 
the East Timorese people . In a letter to the UN Secretary-
General , Mr Perez de Cuellar, on 10 August 1984, Lord Avebury, 
chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group drew 
attention to the failure to draw the Fretilin into the consultations 
and said : 
Frankly , I do not think you will succeed unless you follow the dictates 
of common sense . .. and include the East Timorese on your agenda of 
consultations. 
The underlying factors that have forced both Indonesia and 
Portugal to the negotiating table are Indonesia's failure to crush 
the resistance in East Timor and -continuing international support, 
both inside and outside the UN, for a genuine act of self-
determination that would pave the way for the country's 
independence . These are the critical stumbling-blocks to 
Indonesia's and Portugal's over-riding wish to have East Timor 
wiped off the UN agenda for ever. Portugal's problem too is that 
the continuing dispute with Indonesia obstructs its relations with 
other countries in Southeast Asia . Even more important is the 
pressure now coming from member-states of the European 
Community as negotiations for Portugal 's accession reach the 
concluding stages. Already more than a year ago, President 
Mitterand, contradicted his earlier support for the principle of 
self-determination of East Timor by announcing that France 
would stop abstaining at the UN because of the importance his 
socialist government attaches to expanding economic ties with 
Indonesia. The Community looks upon Indonesia as an important 
trading partner and market for arms, and it would be awkward to 
accept a new member-state that is still in dispute with Indonesia 
over such a fundamental issue as East Timor's right to self-
determination . 
The process leading to the present negotiations was facilitated 
by the visit to Lisbon in September last year of the Australian 
Foreign Minister , Bill Hayden . Press reports at the time of 
Hayden's visit were full of remarks about a "breakthrough" in 
contacts between Portugal and _ Indonesia . For Hayden , the 
problem was to convince Portugal not to recognise Fretilin as 
representing the East Timorese and therefore a legitimate party to 
the negotiations. In turn , Portugal's Foreign Minister , Jaime 
Gama, complained to Hayden about Australia's seabed 
negotiations with Indonesia over exploitation of oil reserves in the 
so-called Timor Gap . He protested that the t_alks implied 
Australia's recognition of Indonesia 's claim to a terntory t~at was 
still under Portuguese jurisdiction . Since then , Australia and 
Indonesia have striven to avoid giving offence to Portugal by 
discussing oil exploitation as a joint venture , thus putting aside for 
the time being any question of territorial recognition . The 
Portuguese government however needed little encour_agement to 
refrain from recognising Fretilin; it has never done so tn any case. 
Pr~sident Eanes , who under the Constitution , exercises special 
powers over East Tim or, was apparently more difficult to 
convince, but has veered to a position that denies Fretilin any 
recognition, taking his cue from the failure so far of the UN to give 
Fretilin recognition as a liberation movement. (He should for once 
perhaps take his cue from General Murdani-he knows more than 
most about the reality of Fretilin 's existence!) 
Terms of the negotiations 
In one critical respect, the present negotiations can be interpreted 
as a climb-down for Indonesia which always insists that East 
Timar is an "internal affair" and thus not a matter for multilateral/ 
UN or bilateral consideration. The fact however that Indonesia 
has now made a "concession" by negotiating with Portugal would 
suggest that the generals in Jakarta believe that the outcome of the 
bilateral negotiations will make the "climb-down" worth while. 
Before negotiations began , the two sides apparently agreed to 
certain "concessions". As a pure formality, Indonesia "conceded" 
that by entering into talks, Portugal would not thereby imply 
recognition of East Timor as an Indonesian province. Portugal 
was thus persuaded to agree not to raise the question of self-
determination, even though it is constitutionally obliged to do so, 
but to confine the talks to "human rights and humanitarian 
affairs" . The human rights question that was raised during the 
November talks concerned the repatriation of Timorese still 
holding Portuguese citizenship who worked for the Portuguese 
colonial regime prior to 1975. By all accounts, the matter did not 
proceed very far since Indonesia failed to produce the promised 
list of names; nor was the list supplied in time for the talks planned 
in December, which in any case did not take place because the 
Indonesians did not turn up . The pitfall in starting with such a 
topic is that these potential repatriants can be used by Indonesia as 
political hostages to an ultimate complete climb-down by Portugal 
on every single issue from self-determination downwards. 
The myth of provincial autonomy 
The opinion is apparently gaining ground in government circles in 
Portugal that the interests of the East Timorese people could best 
be served by persuading Indonesia to grant special autonomy 
rights to East Timar as an Indonesian province. Knowing so little 
about Indonesian history, there are some people who believe that 
this provided a satisfactory solution for Aceh in North Sumatra in 
the late 1950s when the Darul Islam leader, Daud Beureuh, was 
persuaded to agree to Aceh becoming a Daerah Istimewa (Special 
District) with himself as District Head. This arrangement left 
Aceh in fundamentally the same position as any other province, 
except only in matters of religious instruction, customary law and 
education. It is no coincidence that these are precisely the areas 
that Portuguese colonial circles would like to see preserved in East 
Tim or, as a means of retaining some elements of the Portuguese 
tradition in East Timor. Needless to say, the population of East 
Timor has not sacrificed one third of its men, women and children 
to defend Portuguese culture. There should be no illusions in 
anyone's minds: "Special District" status in Indonesia's highly 
centralised system of government, reinforced by the predominant 
and extremely repressive machinery of military administration. 
means absolutely nothing. 
The present secret negotiations are ominously reminiscent of 
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the talks between Indonesia and Holland in 1962, under US and 
UN auspices, which led to the complete sell-out of the West 
Papuan people. Holland then was under pressure from the West, 
particularly the USA, to accept Indonesia's demand for 
annexation. The New York Agreement of 1962 paid lip-service to 
Holland's concern about an act of self-determination in West 
Papua. The Agreement was vague enough and the UN 
unconcerned enough to leave the West Papuan people without 
protection against the forces of occupation which made sure that 
the 1969 Act of "Free" Choice gave them no choice at all. A 
similar deal may satisfy government circles in Lisbon that the 
people of East Timar will be consulted by the military regime, but 
it is idle fancy for anyone to think tnat such a deal will find 
acceptance by the East Timorese people . 
ICRC still excluded from relief work, says 
ICRC President 
The president of the International Committee for the Red Cross, 
M. Alexandre Hay, has drawn attention to East Timor as one of 
the few countries where the ICRC is prevented from giving relief 
to the victims of a military conflict. At a press conference in 
Geneva on 10 January, the ICRC president said many countries, 
among them Indonesia, were making it impossible for the 
Committee to operate in accordance with Geneva conventions 
governing the conduct of war. 
All ICRC relief activity on the island of East Timar came to a 
halt in July 1983 when the Indonesian government withdrew 
facilities a month before launching the August 1983 military 
offensive. Since then, ICRC activities have been confined to 
making food and medical provisions for prisoners on the island of 
Atauro, administering a family reunion programme for Timorese 
wishing to join relatives in Portugal, and occasional prison visits. 
During 1984, the ICRC was permitted to visit East Timorese 
political prisoners on three occasions, in March, June and 
September. The places of detention are not confined to East 
Timor; they include Comarca Prison (Dili), prisons in Kupang 
(West Timor), Los Palos, Viqueque and Baucau as well as 
IWGIA Document 50 
Torben Retb0ll (ed.) 
EAST TIMQR: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES 
Cipinang Prison (Jakarta) and Tangerang Prison (West Java) . 
According to available figures, the number of Timorese political 
prisoners in these places of detention in late 1984 was as follows: 
Kupang (14), Los Palos (75), Baucau (29), Viqueque (23), 
Comarca (188), Cipinang (12), Tangerang (1), and Atauro 
(2,141) . 
A Timorese woman, Dominggus da Costa, is now being held in 
Tangerang Prison, West Java. She was sentenced in Dili to six 
years for supporting Fretilin. She has a child with her in prison. 
(Sinar Harapan 23 November 1984.) 
Birth control for all women of child-bearing age 
The Indonesian administration intends to impose a birth-control 
programme in East Timar that will involve no fewer than 95,000 
women, a figure which cannot be much less than the entire 
number of women of child-bearing age (with total population at 
less than 600,000). The official plan for East Timor during the 
Five-Year Plan (1984-1989) claims that 20,000 women (pengikut 
lestari) are already practising birth control, whilst an additional 
75 ,000 will become new "acceptors" before the current Five-Year 
Plan ends. The intensity of the programme is aimed at "preventing 
an increase in the population of the province". For a territory 
whose population has been decimated by Indonesian depravities 
since 1975, that is cynicism at its most blatant. 
The provincial programme also envisages that "6,800 
transmigrants" will be settled in the province in the same period. 
Normally, figures for transmigration are given in "family heads" 
and we know that 500 "rnodel" families from Bali and Java. have 
been resettled recently in the south-west region of Kovalima. At 4 
or 5 persons per family, the latest figure suggests that there will be 
a two-fold increase in the number of outsiders brought into East 
Timar in the coming four years. These figures exclude non-
sponsored transmigrants as well as the thousands of military and 
non-military personnel now running the administration and 
security affairs. Everything points to the determination of the 
military regime to swamp the country with outsiders and turn the 
Timorese into a minority in their own country within the shortest 
possible time. 
This valuable collection of documents has just been 
produced by the International Work Group on 
Indigenous Affairs (Denmark). 218 pages, with 
illustrations. 
Price:£1.50 plus postage: UK, Europe and surface 
worldwide: £1.00 
Overseas airmail: £3.50 
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Australian ICJ 1nission warns against 
involuntary repatriation 
The Mission of 5 lawyers from the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists and a member of the Netherlands 
Institute of Human Rights which visited West Papuan refugee camps along the PNC-Indonesian border in September almost didn't take 
place. Though visas had been granted and permission given for camps to be visited, the government in Port Moresby had last-minute 
reservations, and only intensive phone-calls and other communications managed to save the venture. 
Moreover, the camps have now been declared off-limits to journalists and almost everyone else, so Australian /Cl's investigations 
could well be the last for some considerable time. PNG Prime Minister Somare recently justified this uncooperative stand, saying he 
didn 't want the camps "to become a tourist attraction". 
Reading the Mission's report which was made public on 10 
December, the reasons for Port Moresby's stand are fairly 
obvious. It was the Mission's considered opinion that "a large 
number of the approximately 11,000 refugees now consider 
themselves to be indefinitely or permanently displaced from 
Irian Jaya", that "this large number of people are either refugees 
within the terms of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees" and that this "is an indication 
of serious problems within Irian Jaya''. (page 58) The Mission's 
crucial recommendation was therefore that "no one be returned 
involuntarily" (page 59) 
The 62-page Mission Report provides an important analysis 
of the inviolability of the principle of "non-refoulement" which 
obliges all countries, whether or not they are signatories of the 
UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees, not to force people 
to return against their will to their ·Country of origin where they 
fear they will be persecuted. This is particularly important since 
neither PNG nor Indonesia are signatories. The Mission argues 
that even non-party States have certain international law obligations 
in relation to refugees. Such obligations may be found in the human 
rights provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights . In particular, it appears that the principle of non-
refoulement has become a part of customary international law 
binding on all States so as to forbid the return of refugees other than 
in circumstances of voluntary repatriation. (page 25-36) 
All camps visited 
The Missions split into two groups so as to visit all the camps in 
the short time at their disposal. They interviewed a large number 
of refugees, some individually and some in groups , and also 
spoke at length with relief workers, church leaders and local 
officials dealing on a day-to-day basis with the refugees . After 
arriving in the border region , they were told of a hitherto 
unannounced large camp in the Western Province. (page 35) 
The following are some samples of their findings in the 
camps: 
Kungim Refugees here have come from five villages in 
Mindiptana. In some cases, the entire village population fled as, 
for example , villagers from Ingembit who fled after Indonesian 
troops carried out operasi turun ("going-down" operation) when 
they entered the villages of Woropka, Tinika and Ninati, and 
shot indiscriminately in the church , the school and in homes . The 
refugees here were unanimous that they would not return to the 
village if the Indonesians did not leave. 
Komopkin This camp with some 2,000 inhabitants was hit by 
starvation in July and August when around one hundred people 
died , largely through lack of help from the authorities (pages 56 
and 57) . The Mission also visited some Komopkin refugees being 
treated in Rumginae Mission Hospital. 165 of the refugees at 
Komopkin had returned voluntarily . . . to join the OPM! 
Unlike those in Kungim, most refugees here seemed to know a 
lot about the OPM. Most had fled their villages, also in 
Mindiptana, after shoot-ups by Indonesian troops in April; many 
had taken months to cross the border. The entire population of 
Ninati had fled , all 755 people . Here too refugees spoke of 
troops shooting up a church (all refugees were Christians) , a 
report corroborated by the Bishop of Kiunga who told the 
Mission that villagers had gathered desecrated religious items 
and brought them to him. No one at this camp expressed a 
willingness to go home , except to join the OPM . 
Green River Many here are traditional border-crossers who 
now regard themselves as refugees because they are afraid to 
return to their villages. Most had also left in April, and gave as 
their reason their desire for independence from Indonesia, their 
fear of losing their land or their fear of Indonesian soldiers. Most 
denied that the OPM had told them to move, though a small 
number said OPM had been a factor . Villagers from Umuaf said 
troops had killed 8 of their people who stayed behind as a 
punishment for the departure of the others. Most striking about 
those in Green River was that many had been driven off their 
land some years ago (some, for instance, in 1973) and had been 
living in the bush since then. Others said they often abandoned 
their villages for a while when they became scared because of 
military operations. 
Kamberatoro Most refugees came in April, mainly of the Dera 
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clan. Another 200 arrived in June from the Senggi district. Here, 
refugees gave reports about the killing of local teachers, which 
had scared everyone not only the teachers. Some now in 
Kamberatoro said they had crossed into PNG in 1978, then 
returned home but had since then lived in the bush because they 
were afraid to return to their village . Here again, many refugees 
said they had been living in the bush for many years. The 
following is typical: 
A man from Komando told us that his people had left (their village) 
in 1978. There had been a history of dissatisfaction with the 
Indonesian military-soldiers would claim people's land and all that 
was on it on payment of an unfairly small sum. But the particular 
trigger for the 1978 exodus appeared to have been the disappearance 
of public servants in the area . They (the villagers) had lived in the 
bush since 1978 but crossed into PNG in March 1984 when 
Indonesian soldiers chased them . (pages 45-46) 
The Mission concludes that the people from the Senggi district 
"seemed to be the only people at Kamberatoro who had not left 
their villages prior to 1984" . (page 46) 
Blackwater Creek (near Vanimo) Most refugees here are 
political activists, former civil servants and army deserters . 
(Recently, the PNG government announced that about 500 at 
this camp had been designated refugees who would be found 
asylum and definitely not returned.) Most said they would face 
trial--0r worse-if forced to return. There were several 
members of Arnold Ap's Mambesak group here, and also his 
widow, Cory Ap and their children. A small number here said 
they wanted to go home, but some made the point that they 
would only do so if allowed to return straight to their village . 
Some people here were tradesmen and fishermen who had 
particular complaints about Sulawesi traders in Jayapura who 
paid very low prices for their products. They said fighting often 
broke out with these traders , "on several occasions leading to a 
number of killings. One such occasion was around the time of 
the planned uprising (in February 1984). " (page 49) 
The following words of one refugee sums up fears expressed 
about transmigration: 
They take many parcels of land without proper payment. People lose 
their lands . People are not paid much attention by the government, 
only transmigrants. And then they become slowly separated from 
their lands .. . We feel that slowly , in future, we will become aliens 
in our own environment. And our culture , the values of our culture, 
are being broken by outside culture from Java or other Indonesian 
islands . And later we will become a minority in our own land. And 
also the influence of Islam because many of the transmigrants are 
Islamic people 
The Mission also collected testimony here about the murder 
of Arnold Ap. His body had been found in a cave . 
Soldiers took it to the military hospital and planned a secret burial, 
but a hospital employee recognised the corpse and word got out. The 
body was then taken to Arnold Ap's house where it was washed and 
placed in another coffin for burial. Our informant , who had known 
Ap for some years, was present and told us that Ap's arms were 
broken and he had bayonet wounds in his sides and stomach. (page 
51) 
The Mission calls for an inquiry into the circumstances of 
Ap's death "in view of statements made by the Indonesian 
government conflicting with evidence made available to the 
Mission and to others" . (page 61) 
Note: Anyone wishing to obtain a copy of the Report should 
write to : Friends of West Papua, PO Box K717, Haymarket , 
NSW 2000, Australia . 
Arnold Ap's 8-year-old son with Marthen Rumabar, member of 
Mambesak Group. 
Refugees repatriated in secret 
Ninety-nine West Papuan refugees at the Black Wara Camp near 
Vanimo on the north coast of Papua New Guinea, not far from 
the border with Indonesia, were repatriated to Indonesia under 
cover of strict secrecy by the PNG authorities on 22 December. 
The refugees, 23 men, 23 women and 53 children, had expressed 
a willingness to go back to their village which is not far from the 
border, but were told they would be escorted back to the border, 
then allowed to make their way home on foot. The villagers 
come from the village of Workwana, in the sub-district of Arso. 
Their repatriation however turned out very differently. 
Without the knowledge of the camp authorities, 102 refugees 
were taken away in darkness at 4am by PNG riot police squads 
and taken to the wharf at Vanimo. When an Indonesian vessel 
arrived, they were told to go on board to be transported back to 
Jayapura, the capital of the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya. 
Three of the men made a getaway, feeling they had been 
betrayed. 
The UN High Commission for Refugees was altogether 
excluded from the operation, contrary to promises by both the 
PNG and Indonesian governments that they would be allowed to 
monitor repatriation. The Sydney paper, National Times, (28 
December 1984) reports that UNHCR officials were angry about 
being ignored . The only officials who accompanied the refugees 
from the PNG side were agents from the National Intelligence 
Organisation and the PNG defence Force intelligence. They only 
escorted the refugees back to Jayapura, then returned 
immediately to PNG without waiting to see what happened . 
The operation has brought a protest from Bishop John 
Etheridge of Vanimo who helps to run the Black Wara camp. 
While he agreed that the refugees in question had wanted to 
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return home , "rounding them up under cover of darkness was a 
bad move". They wanted to travel overland, he said (Times of 
PNG , 30 December, 1984) . In fact, their village is much nearer 
Vanimo than Jayapura and the journey home would have been 
an easy one. 
Greg Mongi , secretary of the Catholic Commission for Justice 
and Peace in Port Moresby, afterwards warned the PNG 
government against being a party to displacing the West 
Papuans . 
New PNG Foreign Minister 
The under-cover operation which was also kept secret from the 
churches and the West Sepik provincial government , is being 
linked to the appointment just a few days earlier, of a new PNG 
Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu, though 
willing to work bilaterally with Jakarta on repatriation, has upset 
the Indonesian government on a number of occasions, most 
recently by his outspoken remarks at the UN General Assembly 
in 1984 on the border conflict between PNG and Indonesia. His 
successor, John Giheno , a former Police Minister, is described 
by the National Times as "a knockabout politician" who is 
expected to launch a policy of getting tough over t.he border, 
including moving more firmly against the OPM (the West 
Papuan liberation movement) . He played a key role in the 
controversy over the Australian TV Four Corners programme 
on the border issue, when the PNG Prime Minister tried 
unsuccessfully to force the ABC to delete an interview with 
OPM leader John Nyaro. 
The return of the 99 on board an Indonesian vessel gave the 
government authorities in Jayapura the opportunity to treat the 
event as a ceremony for public relations purposes. All top 
provincial officials including the military commander, Major-
General Maliana Sembiring, the governor, Izaac Hindom and 
the Deputy Governor, Brigadier-General Sugiyono, were there 
to welcome the refugees back. They were told that new houses 
had been built for them in their village, and that the 
development of nucleus estates in the Arso region would give 
them the chance to advance their economic conditions. 
More refugees arriving as some 
go home 
Claims made recently by the Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Mochtar Kusumaatmaja that as many as two thousand refugees 
may already have trickled back home have been discounted by 
people closely monitoring affairs in PNG. "The refug~es are ?Y 
no means convinced that it is safe to go back". said a rehef 
worker. They will hear stories about Indonesia~ m.ilita~y 
operations and as a result, their political determmatton 1s 
hardening. Many refugees are saying they will never go home." 
(The Guardian, London, 15 January 1985.) 
The PNG press reports that nearly five hundred West 
Papuans crossed over from Indonesia in December. They fled, 
they told PNG border officials, because Indonesian troops had 
again been raiding villages and destroying food crops and 
houses. The refugees thought the new operations were in 
retaliation for the attack on an Indonesian repatriation team by 
refugees at the Vanimo refugee camp in November. (See 
TAPOL Bulletin No.66, November 1984.) The refugees have 
arrived at Green River camp in several groups, swelling the 
number of refugees there from about 200 to 687 . As a result, 
conditions in the makeshift huts that have been built with bush 
material supplied by local villagers are now very overcrowded. 
Murdani's tough Christmas message 
Meanwhile, Armed Forces Commander, General Benny 
Murdani, who flew into lrian Jaya from East Timor to spend the 
post-Christmas days in Indonesia's other trouble-spot, used the 
occasion to deliver a warning that the Armed Forces will act 
firmly against anyone who speaks or acts in a way that could 
divide the Indonesian nation. People should not think along 
religious or ethnic lines but only as part of the great Indonesian 
nation. 
Murdani's speech to a gathering of local community leaders 
and government officials in Wamena, the capital of Jayawijaya 
District, is a reflection of the army's determination to stamp out 
ethnic differences and enforce a standard Indonesian (read: 
Javanese) pattern everywhere . He told his mainly Papuan 
audience that the newcomers (ie. transmigrants) were coming to 
"advance their friends in Irian Jaya. Look upon them as people 
from the same Indonesian roots as yourselves, not as part of an 
effort to colonise you". But people should also realise, he said, 
that the Indonesian government is not rich enough to develop 
this great nation of ours all at once, quickly and everywhere. "Be 
assured that Irian Jaya will one day get its turn to receive the 
proper attention." (Sinar Harapan, 27 December 1984.) 
He also dealt with the other main cause ·for unrest in the 
province, the feeling that a mainly Christian population is being 
swamped by outsiders who are Muslims. 
Police attacked in Tanah Merah 
Two Indonesian police officers who were on their way from 
Tanah Merah to Mindiptana in the district of Merauke, were 
attacked by OPM fighters when they stopped at the village of 
Mawan intending to stay overnight. The house where they were 
staying was suddenly surrounded by OPM guerrillas armed with 
knives and firearms. The policemen tried to disarm the guerrilla 
who entered the house but were fired upon and decided to flee 
for their lives back to Tanah Merah . With bullets whizzing 
around them, they made a getaway, and returned separately to 
base. 
A report of the incident appeared in Sinar Harapan (10 
January), an unusual thing to happen. The Chief of Police of 
Irian Jaya refused to respond to questions from the daily about 
the skirmish, except to say that the two officers had been given 
"a warm welcome" on their return to Merauke. 
The 1985-86 Budget gives government employees a rise--
kenaikan gaji-of 20%, but puts an across-the-board new tax of 
10% on petroleum. Many commentators agree that this and other 
budgetary decisions will cause considerable price rises--kenaikan 
harga. (Cartoon from Sinar Harapan.) 
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Britain's arnis exports to Indonesia escalate 
British Aerospace, the company which several years ago sold Hawk ground-attack aircraft to Indonesia, has now won '1 major new contract 
to supply Indonesia with its Rapier air-defence missile system. The Rapier is a short-range, light, highly mobile ground-to-air missile system 
which is said to have "performed well in the Falklands war". The system is transportable by air or land. The contract, worth £100 million, 
comes after "a concerted effort by British Aerospace and Ministry of Defence officials in recent months". (Financial Times, 14 December 
1984.) This effort culminated in an extended visit to Indonesia by Britain 's Chief of Defence Staff, Sir Edwin Bramall in November. (See 
TAPOL Bulletin No . 66, November 1984.) The deal comes hard on the heels of another deal under which Britain is supplying the 
Indonesian Navy with three refitted frigates worth £26.6 million. 
The Rapier System and Indonesia's new strike force 
Under a major reorganisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces 
which is due to commence in a few months' time , the Indonesian 
Army will further bolster its rapid deployment force capability as 
the main form of "defence" against "enemy forces" . In Indonesian 
army parlance , the rapid deployment force is to be known as 
Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat (PPRC) . 
The PPRC is the latest development of the Army's strike force 
which has for nearly three decades been its main combat element. 
The first strike-force commander was Achmed Yani , the general 
who led the expeditionary force against the regional rebellion 
based in West Sumatra in 1958, and the man who, as Army Chief-
of-Staff, was murdered in October 1965 in the Suharto-
manipulated coup .. Already in 1961, the strike force had been 
unified into a corps called CADUAD, under the command of 
Major-General (now General) Suharto. Suharto remained 
commander when CADUAD was upgraded as a command and 
called KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) in 1963. 
It had by that time become the most powerful force in the army , 
virtually free from the control of the Army General Staff. It was 
from this extremely powerful vantage point that Suharto took 
power in October 1965. The strike-force troops, notably the 
paracommandos known as the RPKAD (now Kopassandha), were 
used under Suharto's direction to spearhead the massacres of late 
1965 when an estimated one million people were killed and many 
mass organisations were physically annihilated, including the 
three-million strong Indonesian Communist Party. Since then , the 
strike-force element under KOSTRAD has been used on many 
occasions in attempts to crush resistance to Indonesian rule in 
West Papua and East Timor. 
The Army's current "defence" strategy is focussed on its 
updated strike force, the PPRC which is being developed as part 
of KOSTRAD. According to Sinar Harapan (29 November 1984) , 
the plan is to maintain troops in various parts of the country in a 
constant state of alert, ready to be transported within hours to 
"trouble-spots" anywhere in the archipelago . The main target for 
PPRC forays will clearly be local upheavals and possible 
widespread demonstrations or "riots" , but another task for the 
PPRC will be to defend key economic installations built in far-
flung parts of the country such as North and West Sumatra, 
Kalimantan and West Papua which could conceivably come under 
attack from some external attacker. These installations are so 
expensive and vital to the present economic structure , the paper 
says, that it is not possible for the Army to retreat to the hills and 
wage guerrilla struggle as happened (or was supposed to happen) 
during the early years of the Republic. The projects must be 
defended against possible seizure or destruction . 
The Rapier air-defence system is clearly integral to this rapid 
deployment force strategy . While it is not likely to be used against 
Fretilin or the OPM (the very ones who stand in need of air 
defences) , the Rapiers will help to reinforce the PPRC, the 
spearhead force directed against the people for purposes of 
repression and subjugation. 
In British government terms, the Rapier deal is "a significant 
breakthrough" in what is seen as a rapidly expanding market for 
other British arms manufacturers . British Aerospace, which 
prides itself on being Britain's No . I manufacturing exporter and 
has won the Queen's Award for Exporting for two years running, 
apparently hopes to sell even more Rapiers than those covered 
under the contract signed last month, as more Indonesian officers 
will be undergoing training in Britain than are actually required 
for the present system . (Financial Times. 3 January 1985.) The 
company also hopes to follow this up with the sale of a new 
generation of Hawk fighters-the 200 series-to the Indonesian 
Air Force . One of the reasons for the company's optimism is that 
Washington is showing reluctance about supplying Indonesia with 
F-16 jet fighters which are , in any case, about three times as 
expensive as the Hawks. 
The Rapier deal also represents a breakthrough in the sense 
that other war equipment can be expected to lengthen the list of 
Indonesian purchases from the UK . Furthermore , many 
Indonesian officers will be coming here for training while British 
Aerospace personnel will be closely involved in back-up and other 
services in Indonesia . 
:I#., '%%$,.. 
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Rapiers on the ntove 
Tempo (22 December 1984) describes the Rapier System being 
purchased from Britain as a highly mobile, easy-to-operate 
system with a fail-safe device against hitting your own aircraft. It 
will be used especially to protect "vital" installations in Java and 
Aceh and will be operated by the Army's Air Defence Artillery 
unit. 
Conibat-tested warships for Indonesian 
navy 
The three "Tribal" -class frigates purchased from Britain last 
August by the Indonesian Navy were on active service 
throughout the Falklands war. Prior to that, these three vessels, 
HMS Ghurka, HMS Zulu and HMS Tartar, were to have been 
scrapped but the war changed all that and they have now been 
refitted with the most up-to-date missiles and radar equipment 
for target detection and defence against missile attack, including 
two 112-mm guns and "seacat" anti-aircraft missiles . 
The exceptional suitability of British naval vessels for the 
Indonesian Navy is discussed at length in an article in Sinar 
Harapan (18 December 1984). The important thing about vessels 
of war, it writes, is that the weaponry and radar equipment on 
board must be as up-to-date as possible . Ships have a "hull life" 
of anything up to 30 years, yet missiles and radar equipment are 
developing so fast that the most attractive vessels are those that 
are adaptable enough to be refitted with the latest in weapons of 
destruction. Britain's experience during the Falklands war, in 
particular the "shock-waves" that hit warship designers and 
navies around the world when the HMS Sheffield was sunk by 
French-supplied exocet missiles early in the war, led to a major 
overhaul of detection equipment and its location on board a 
warship. In fact, the article stresses, the HMS Sheffield disaster 
vindicated the views of the US Navy officer, Vice-Admiral Julian 
S. Lake, who told a seminar in 1980 that warships built in 
peacetime are never as efficient as warships built in wartime. 
Thus, Britain's experience of sea-based warfare in the South 
Atlantic, gained at the expense of hundreds of Argentinian and 
British lives, has made it possible for arms manufacturers in this 
country to capitalise by winning new contracts for equipment 
that has been refined by the best teacher of all, real-life war. 
Sinar Harapan also points out that the advantage of the 
British deal rests in the low cost and quick delivery. It would 
take two to four years to secure delivery of new frigates which 
would cost anything up to $60 million each. By contrast, the 
three British frigates are as good as new, have been supplied 
within months at a total cost of only $30 million (about £26.6 
million), and are guaranteed to last at least 10 years. 
Oddly enough, while speaking at length about the value to 
the Indonesian Armed Forces of battle-tested bargains from 
Britain, Sinar Harapan seems to have been under some 
constraint about publicising the fact-that it is Indonesia who has 
purchased the frigates named Ghurka, Zulu and Tartar. It writes 
only that the vessels were bought by "a certain country". 
Perhaps the military authorities in Jakarta are worried that, by 
drawing too much attention to their burgeoning arms trade with 
Britain, pressure could develop here against the current upsurge 
in Britain's support for the military region. 
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The Tanjung Priok massacre 
Many ill~gal documents have appeared in Indonesia since the bloody massacre of demonstrators by troops in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's har-
bour region, on Wednesday 12 September. TA POL has compiled the following report from information contained in recently received il-
legal documents, counter-checked against information from other reliable sources: 
* The incident was provoked by a local army officer's visit to 
Assa'dah Mushollah (prayer-house) when he demanded that 
wall notices for future sermons be removed. (Many local 
preachers have attacked government policy, particularly the 
requirement that all social and religious-based organisations 
abandon their own ideological principles and adopt the State 
ideology as their sole principle.) 
bayonets. Bystanders who tried to help the injured were shot. 
* A few days later , army officers returned to the mushollah 
which they entered without removing their boots and threw 
gutter-water on wall-notices that had not been removed . 
* Apart from a few of the injured who got away to local 
hospitals, local inhabitants were prevented from retrieving 
the bodies or helping the injured . Soon after the massacre, 
army trucks arrived to haul off the bodies and remove the 
injured, all of whom were transported to the Army Hospital 
in Jakarta. All other hospitals were instructed not to accept 
any casualties from the tragedy. Fire engines soon arrived on 
the scene to wash away all signs of blood on the street. 
* When mushollah representatives sought redress from local 
officials for their grievances against the army officers' 
behaviour and invited one of the officers to discuss the matter 
at a local office , the two men were arrested , as well as another 
congregant nearby. Later, the chairman of the mushollah was 
also arrested . 
* The most comprehensive account of the massacre puts the 
number of dead at 63 and the number of seriously wounded at 
over a hundred. The speed of the Army's cover-up operation 
explains why estimates of the casualties have been so difficult 
to confirm. 
* A rally took place on 12 September demanding the release of 
the four men because efforts so far had failed to get any 
response from the military authorities. 
* General Benny Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-
Chief was present throughout the operation, watched its 
progress with Major-General Tri Sutrisno, Jakarta Military 
Commander, and is reported to have walked over the 
sprawled bodies of the dead and injured. 
* A large , unarmed crowd then marched to the local army and 
police offices to press their demand . Speeches at the rally had 
been relayed by loudspeakers over a wide area , as is the 
practice . By the time the marchers began , the streets were 
lined with heavily-armed troops. 
* The demonstrators were stopped short by a company of air 
artillery troops which has barracks in the area, and by three 
truckloads of troops armed with automatic weapons . Without 
warning, the troops fired direct into the crowd. Hundreds 
fell . Some of the injured who rose to their feet were killed by 
A niother' s letter 
Assalamu'alaikum wa rahmatullah wa 
barakatuhu. I am Zuchra I. Biki, the 
mother of the late Amir Biki. 
On 12 September 1984 my son was killed 
by the regime's automatic weapons. While I 
have sincerely accepted Allah's will, my 
heart still laments my late son's departure. 
As my first grief has begun to cease, I wish 
to complain to the Indonesian people. Since 
the newspapers cannot express my feelings, 
I have therefore chosen this way. Far from 
being instigated and far from any feeling of 
revenge, I fully realise that what I am doing 
now is in the interest of the people and the 
state. 
Officially, our state is based on 
Pancasila. Up to now, I could accept the 
possibility that the authorities could 
sincerely experience as well as put Pancasila 
into practice. But after the security forces 
of the authorities butchered the masses at 
Tanjung Priok on Wednesday 12 
September 1984, I have become convinced 
that the government has not, however, 
experienced Pancasila, let alone put it into 
practice. How on earth could we find 
Pancasila which declares "just and civilised 
humanitarianism" while the government 
did nothing to prevent its forces from firing 
their automatic weapons at the 
"demonstration of feeling" by the masses. 
Couldn't they deal with the situation by 
using fire engines, tear-gas, batons, and so 
on, for example, as practiced in other 
countries? The "show of feeling" was not an 
act of war. 
As he previously often did, my son made 
an attempt to mediate between the people 
and the authorities. Nevertheless, the same 
methods he used to apply now appeared to 
fail in securing the release of his four 
innocent colleagues, detained by the 
Military District Command, for whom 
Amir Biki felt he had some moral 
responsibility. So it was a "show of feeling" 
which he wished to stage, and he even gave 
a warning that no one should resort to 
rowdiness. 
Amir Biki was not the "leader of an 
irresponsible illegal gang" whose life had to 
be terminated by bullet. In 1966 he was in 
the forefront commanding the "Tendean 
Battalion/ Arif Rahman Hakim" university 
students regiment and was taking part in 
establishing the "New Order". It was only 
his hand and leg which received injury 
during that "show of feeling" for the 
restoration of the 1945 Constitution. 
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However, 18 years later, struggling for the 
same principle, he was shot dead. The 
authorities knew him pretty well. It is 
unthinkable that there was no other method 
that could be used to convince him apart 
from using the gun. 
I, Zuchra I. Biki, have vowed to 
continue the struggle waged by my son, 
Haji Amir Biki, so that the Indonesian 
people in general and Muslims in particular 
would be liberated from both the physical 
and mental injustice of the present regime. 
This state should really be founded on 
Pancasila. Members of the government 
should be those who could convince us by 
experiencing Pancasila and putting it into 
practice earnestly. 
In the name of Allah the Beneficent and 
the Merciful, let us carry on our struggle 
sincerely, more wisely, and more 
intensively. May Allah the Almighty bless 
our struggle. Wassalamu'alaikum wa 
rahmatullah wa barakatuhu. 
Haijah Zuchra I. Biki 
Jakarta, 15 September 1984 
Published in Impact International 
(London) , 26 October-8 November 1984. 
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Many Muslims charged with 
subversion 
The courts in Jakarta have begun to hear a number of trials in 
which the defendants are all Muslim political prisoners. The 
trials are part of a major campaign by the government to stamp 
out the political unrest and opposition that reached a climax in 
the second half of 1984. The unrest has taken a variety of forms : 
out-spoken sermons and lectures in the mosques, dissemination 
of anti-government leaflets and acts of arson . and bombings 
following the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984 when 
at least 63 were shot dead by troops. Needless to say, those 
responsible for the massacre are not being called to account, let 
alone tried. 
The unrest has been prompted by dissatisfaction among 
Muslims as the military government presses ahead with its 
intention to compel all parties and social organisations to accept 
the state ideology called Pancasila as their sole principle . 
The trials already under way or due to start soon can be 
divided into several groups: 
* Defendants accused of involvement in the bombing on 4 
October 1984 of two branch offices of the Bank Central Asia, 
the property of General Suharto's close associate, the 
business magnate, Liem Sioe Liang, 
* Defendants accused of producing, reproducing and/or 
disseminating illegal pamphlets which are critical of the 
government or which challenge General Benny Murdani's 
version of what happened in Tanjung Priok last September; 
* Defendants accused of being "extremist lecturers" 
(penceramah extrim) who are in fact lay-preachers known as 
mubaligh . Some of these "extremist lecturers" on trial spoke 
at the meeting in Tanjung Priok on 12 September which 
preceded the mass demonstration to the army and police 
headquarters that ended in the massacre; 
* Defendants accused of harassing and intimidating the army 
officer who came to the prayerhouse in Tanjung Priok and 
ordered the removal of notices from the walls. 
All those being tried except the last group are being charged 
under the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963 which enables courts to 
bring sentences of anything up to death . This Law, used 
repeatedly by the regime since 1965 against political opponents 
of many political hues, is renowned for its vagueness of 
definition on what constitutes an act of subversion. 
Many defence lawyers mobilised to help 
Several dozen lawyers have made themselves available to assist 
the Muslim defendants , each of whom is being provided by a 
team of three or four lawyers. So far, the press reports of trials 
have consisted almost entirely of accounts of the prosecution 
case· it remains to be seen whether the defence will be reported 
' 
as fully . 
A team of lawyers called "Team to Defend the Mubaligh/ 
Political Cases" has been set up with members from three legal 
aid groups , the Jakarta and national Legal Aid In~titutes (LBH 
and YLBHI), the Legal Aid Advisers to Mubahghs, and the 
League for the Defence of Basic Human Rights. Mr T. Mulya 
Lubis, chairman of the YLBHI who is chairing and co-ordinating 
the Mubaligh/Political Cases Team, said recently that it had been 
asked to handle 19 subversion cases so far. 
A . A. G . Ngurah, head of Public Relations of the Attorney-
General's Office , told journalists during an official briefing in 
November that the charges in most of the cases would be based 
on the Anti-Subversion Law. and went on: 
The detentions and arrests that have taken place are not directed 
against the opposition because there is no such thing as an opposition 
in our democracy. It's only under liberal democracy that such a thing 
exists. This means that those who are now under arrest are people 
who have committed crimes. (Sinar Harapan, 21 November 1984.) 
Mulya Lubis does not agree . In his own briefing with the 
press at which he announced the creation of the Mubaligh/ 
Political Cases Defence Team, he was asked whether there was 
such a thing as political trials in Indonesia, to which he replied: 
"Then what is subversion if it isn't political?" (Sinar Harapan, 22 
November.) 
The Assa'ad Mushollah trial 
The Tanjung Priok massacre was sparked off by provocative 
actions of a local military officer known as the babinsa who 
entered the Assa'ad musholla (prayer-house) and ordered 
notices announcing lectures to be removed from the walls. But 
justice has been turned on its head; the babinsa who caused the 
trouble is appearing not as the accused but as the chief 
prosecution witness against the people he offended and angered. 
Victims in the dock: From left 
M. Nur, Syarifuddin Rambe, 
Sulaiman and Achmad Sabi. 
The Assa'ad Mushollah, Tanjung Priok. 
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The four on trial are Syarifuddin Rambe, 39, a watch 
repairer , Achmad Sabi , 35, a cargo supervisor at Bulog, the 
logistics agency, Syafwan Sulaiman, 33, a worker , and Muhamad 
Nur bin Amat, 22. The first three are alleged to have spread 
"false information" and are charged with inciting to riot and 
causing a public disturbance. The charges carry a sentence of up 
to 10 years. The "false information" concerned Sergeant 
Herman who entered their musholla without removing his shoes; 
he then smeared notices on the walls with gutter-water after 
trying unsuccessfully to remove them with his bare hands . The 
incident was witnessed by three others , all of whom are said to 
be in hiding, but the three accused, when 'told about it, "without 
checking whether it was true", spread the report to people 
around, causing anger and consternation" . 
In his evidence, Sergeant Hermanu told the court he had used 
gutter water to remove the notices because they were so firmly 
stuck on. But press reports about whether he said he was 
wearing his boots vary . The Jakarta Post ( 11 January) has him 
saying that he did not remove them, while Sinar Harapan (11 
January) heard him say he did. The Post also rep~rts that the 
court frequently warned the Sergeant "for his bad attitude in 
court". When asked if he had obtained permission from the 
neighbourhood authorities to remove the notices, he replied : "I 
am a soldier. They are my subordinates" . 
If that's his attitude towards officials, it's not difficult to 
imagine how he behaved towards ordinary members of the 
public. 
Syarifuddin Rambe and Syafwan Sulaiman are also accused 
of "forcing" Sergeant Hermanu and another soldier to go to the 
neighbourhood security post to answer for their behaviour and 
apologise to the assembled crowd, some of whom pelted the 
soldiers with stones and sand. It was when other troops arrived 
on the scene to "rescue" Hermanu and his colleague, that the 
men were arrested. 
The defence lawyers have been prevented from asking a 
number of "suggestive" questions in court and reminqed by the 
presiding judge that this is "an ordinary criminal case" which has 
nothing to do with religion, mubalighs or mushollas . 
The fourth man on trial is accused of having "pushed , hit, 
overturned and burned" Sergeant Hermanu's motorbike . 
A complaint by the defence about irregularities in the way the 
men were detained was dismissed by the court. Although press 
reports do not explain, the complaint must have concerned the 
fact that the arrests were made by the army, not the police , 
which is the only authority entitled to make arrests under the 
Procedural Code (KUHAP). 
The BCA bombing trial 
The first to appear for trial in connection with the bombs 
exploded at two branches of Bank Central Asia and a shop is 
Rachmat Basuki, who is accused of master-minding the 
operation. The accused is not a newcomer to the subversion 
.courts. He was tried and sentenced to two years for his part in 
the so-called 20 March 1978 affair when a group of Muslim 
activists staged a demonstration in a hotel where members of the 
upper chamber (MPR) were staying, just before the MPR met, 
elected General Suharto uncontested for a third term as 
president and decided on an elaborate p~ogramme of Panc_asila 
indoctrination. Four others are to be tned for the bombings . 
One is Ir M. Sanusi former government minister whose trial is 
now under way. The others are Tasrif Tuaskal, Eddy Ramli, 
Metta Halim alias Yunus, and Jayadi (sometimes spelt Zayadi). 
According to the prosecution, the accused met Tasrif four 
days after the Tanjung Priok ~a~sacr~ to disc~ss an idea to bomb 
Pertamina and PLN (electnc1ty) installations. The accused 
disagreed because the targets are vit~l to the .~ublic and 
suggested instead the BCA centr~I office, as a sy_mbol _of 
Chinese domination" . (BCA's leading share-holder , Liem S1oe 
Trials Trials Trials 
Liong, is a close business associate of General Suharto.) In the 
event , the head office was not targetted because it was too 
heavily guarded. The plan was further discussed at a meeting on 
18 September attended by A.M. Fatwa and Major-General 
(ret.) H .R. Dharsono both of whom are due to be tried as well. 
The accused stressed the need to avoid casualties by giving 
advance notice of the bomb attacks and was later disconcerted 
that two people in fact died and another person was wounded. 
He was also unhappy at the amateurish performance; one of the 
persons who placed a bomb made a mistake fixing the timer and 
injured himself. 
Rachmat's defence team consists of Yap Thiam Hien of the 
LBH , H.C. Princen of the Human Rights League and H . Dault 
of the Mubaligh Legal Advisors Team. Commenting to a Tempo 
journalist after the first hearing at which the indictment was 
read, Rachmat Basuki said the prosecution was 99% correct , but 
"the 1 % from me can finish off all the rest". He asked the court 
for a typewriter so that he could write up his version of what 
happened (Tempo, 12 January 1985) . 
Nalapraja in Attendance 
Security control of people wishing to attend the hearing was very 
tight, and metal detectors were used . Among those attending 
was Brigadier-General Eddy Nalapraja, former intelligence chief 
of the Jakarta Military Command, now Deputy Governor of the 
Jakarta Municipality, whose name has been closely linked to the 
Tanjung Priok massacre . He is known to have been acquainted 
for many years with one of the victims of the massacre, Amir 
Biki , who urged the people attending the meeting on 12 
September to march on the police and army offices. Nalapraja , 
according to some sources, a close friend of Murdani's, is 
believed to have helped fan the flames at the time , possibly with 
the purpose of embarrassing the present Jakarta commander, 
Major-General Tri Soetrisno who, unlike most senior army 
officers, is a devout Muslim. Nalapraja 's (and Murdani's) plans 
however went awry because protest after Tanjung Priok got out 
of hand , compelling Murdani himself to rush round the country 
placating Muslim communities . 
The Illegal Pamphlets Trial 
The leaflets trial comes after a period when illegal pamphlets 
have been widely circulating in many parts of Indonesia. The 
Jogjakarta Military Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tuswandi 
has complained that no fewer than 15 types of leaflets are 
circulating in his area of command, by comparison with three to 
five circulating in other major cities. The leaflets were mostly 
sent through the post and were addressed to local military police 
offices as well as to youth groups in the city and surrounding 
villages. In Sukabumi District, West Java, a huge pile of neatly 
wrapped , offset-printed illegal leaflets weighing no less than a 
ton , was discovered down a disused well when army troops 
carried out a raid on Cibenda Village. Later the actual weight of 
the leaflets was challenged by the West Java military authorities 
saying it was "only" several quintals (a quintal equals 100 
kilograms) . 
The trial scheduled to begin in Jakarta has three defendants, 
identified in the press only by their initials. They are S.H. bin K. 
(24 years old), A .S. bin K. (20 years) and R .Z.L. (22 years). 
S.H. bin K. is described as a trader; the other two are school-
students. They are accused of handing round a leaflet "inciting ill 
feelings in the community" and "contradicting the official 
explanation by General Benny Murdani of the events in Tanjung 
Priok". A .S. bin K. is accused of having received two copies of 
this dangerous leaflet, whereupon he made 20 copies and gave 
them to people at a prayer-house (mushollah) in Tanah Abang, 
Jakarta. S.H . bin K, the one said to have produced the two 
leaflets, even went so far as to urge others to "go on strike". As 
for R .Z.L, he didn't give the leaflets away but sold them to 
people at the Arief Rachman Hakim Mosque in Central Jakarta. 
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Former Minister on trial 
Ir. H. Muhamad Sanusi, 63, Industries Minister in Suharto's first 
cabinet from 1966 to 1968 and later an elected member of 
Parliament (1971-77) is also on trial, accused of providing the 
funds for the 4 October bombing incident. Sanusi was one of the 
signatories of the White Paper (see TAPOL Bulletin No .66, 
November 1984) which gave an independent account of the 
events leading up to the Tanjung Priok massacre. Sanusi is from 
the modernist Muslim social organisation Muhamadiyah. 
The accused is charged under the Anti-Subversion Law. He 
has denied all the charges and declared that he knows none of 
the people standing trial in connection with the bombings except 
for Rachmat Basuki . 
"Extremist Lecturer" Trials 
The mubalighs who are due to come up for trial as "extremist 
lecturers" include A.M. Fatwa, secretary of Ali Sadikin and a 
frequent victim of army persecution and detention, Tony Ardie 
who was arrested and tried in 1983 for an "inflammatory" 
mosque speech which touched on the sensitive issue of head-
scarves for Muslim girls at school, and Abdul Qadir Jaelani who, 
like Rachmat Basuki, was tried and sentenced in connection with 
the 20 March 1978 affair. The two latter plus Mawardi Nur, 
chairman of the Indonesian Mubalighs Corps are to be tried for 
their speeches at the 12 September meeting in Tanjung Priok. 
Another "extremist lecturer" now under arrest and awaiting 
trial is Professor H . Usman al Hamidy, Rector of the Islamic 
Dakwah (Missionary) College, PTDI. No doubt these "extremist 
lecturers" will have a good chance to air their views in court , 
which could make interesting reading in the press or later, if 
published illegally as student defendants in 1978 published their 
defence speeches. 
Acehnese Commander gets life 
Muhammad Idris , a leading member of the Free Aceh 
Movement (National Liberation Movement of Aceh-Sumatra), 
has been sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of 
subversion . The trial was cond.ucted by the Langsa District 
Court. 
Tempo (24 November 1984), reporting the verdict, wrote that 
Death Sentence 
Muslim Prisoner could be 
executed soon ... 
A Muslim political prisoner, Salman Hafidz, who was 
sentenced to death for his part in an attack on a police 
station in Cicendo, West Java is to face the firing squad 
soon, according to a spokesman of the High Court in 
Bandung West Java. The incident, which occurred in 
March 1981, resulted in the death of three policemen. It 
occurred just shortly before a Garuda plane was hijacked 
to Bangkok Airport. During the trial of another prisoner 
held responsible for the hijack, the defence lawyers 
presented evidence in court that army intelligence had 
infiltrated the group. 
Besides being accused of involvement in the attack on 
the police station, Salman Hafidz was accused of 
undermining state authority and attempting to replace the 
Pancasila state with an Islamic state. These are the charges 
that presumably earned him the death sentence; homicide 
does not carry the death sentence under Indonesian law, 
whereas subversion does. 
The convicted man took his appeal up to the highest 
level, but on 5 January , President Suharto rejected his 
request for clemency. A report in Sinar Harapan (21 
Trials Trials Trials 
Idris "passionately upheld his support for an in.d~pen~ent Aceh" 
during his defence plea and insisted on descnbmg himself as a 
citizen of the state of Aceh , a commander now being tried by a 
foreign state . 
The sentence passed by the Court was far in excess of the 
prosecutor's request for 12 years. Nor did the judges bother to 
complete the usual procedure of hearing a second ro~nd. of 
prosecution and defence statements after the d~fendant s first 
plea. Instead, without even adjourning the heanng, the Cou~t 
announced its verdict and sentence only half an hour after ldns 
h,ad read out his 18-page defence plea . . 
The announcement of the verdict brought an emotional 
response from the several thousand people following the 
proceedings inside and outside the courtroom. Many people 
outside pushed hard to get into the courtroom, "hysterically 
yelling slogans in support of the defendant", reported Tempo. 
Scuffles broke out with the security forces who, according to 
Tempo, were expecting such a violent response. It was only with 
great difficulty that they managed to get their prisoner away 
from the scene "and fled with him, straight back to the prison". 
The crowd had been able to follow everything through a 
loudspeaker relaying proceedings to the street outside . The 
loudspeaker had been installed after Idris demanded at the first 
hearing that the trial should be held in public, and refused to 
participate in further hearings unless a loudspeaker was 
installed . 
The defendant is a graduate of the Medan Agricultural 
Academy and was employed by PT Asamera Oil Company, a 
sub-contractor for Pertamina. He joined the Free Aceh 
Movement founded by Teugku Hasan di Tiro in 1976, and 
became a regional commander for the Peureulak Region a year 
later. He is alleged to have seized a small quantity of arms from 
Indonesian troops, and wrote a manual on "The Strategy and 
Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare". When he was arrested in May 
1982, he was said to be carrying a gun and 60 bullets. 
Two Acehnese Fighters Given 2112 years 
In a series of trials now under way of Acehnese liberation 
fighters, two others, Umar Ahmad and Hamn Ali were 
sentenced to 2112 years each by the District Court in Sigli. Umar 
Ahmad is said to have escorted Dr Zaini and Dr Husaini , two 
Free Aceh Movement leaders, when they escaped to Malaysia 
several years ago. He was captured on that occasion but 
managed to escape and was not re-arrested until 1984. 
January) said arrangements for the execution weere under 
way, but denied rumours circulating that Salman Hafidz 
had already been shot . 
... but two others saved 
The Dutch Foreign Minister announced in Parliament on 
20 November last that the Dutch Government has been 
given an assurance by the Indonesian Government that the 
death sentences against Ga tot Lestario (Sutaryo) and 
Djoko Untung will not be carried out even though their 
requests for clemency have been rejected by the President. 
(See TAPOL Bulletin No. 66, November 1984) 
The assurance follows a similar assurance given to the 
Dutch Government in May 1980 that political prisoners 
under sentence of death would not be executed. The frame 
of reference at that time was the many 1965 prisoners who 
had been given death sentences. The assurance given last 
November was in response to a question raised in the 
Dutch Parliament about Djoko Untung and Gatot 
Lestario. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den 
Broek also said in his reply that the Dutch Government 
will continue to pay attention to the matter. 
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Five foreign journalists expelled 
Five foreign journalists have been obliged to give up their 
assignments in Indonesia in the past 12 months because the 
government took strong objection to stories they filed . All of 
them represented leading news agencies or dailies . Earlier, the 
government had directed its exclusion orders mainly against 
Australian journalists and the occasional "troublesome" Dutch 
journalist. 
None of the journalists removed in the latest expulsions could 
be described as strongly critical of the military regime; indeed, 
most have been generally sympathetic. Their only "crime" is that 
they tried to probe a little deeper into political developments, 
going beyond official explanations. 
The first to be told to leave was Elizabeth Reckweg of UPI 
who upset the government because she published figures about 
Indonesian troop deployment in East Timor. (Unfortunately, 
T APOL was not aware of her report at the time.) Then followed 
Gilles Bertin, writing for Agence France Press who was 
apparently told to leave because of a report about the Petition-
of-50 group and its leader, Ali Sadikin . (We did not see this 
report either, though we did receive and use a number of his 
reports about conditions and the state of fighting in East Timor 
which could hardly have pleased the government.) 
Next to go was Joseph Manguno, correspondent of the Asian 
Wall Street Journal though as far as we know, no specific reason 
was given for his expulsion . Not long after, Susumu Awanohara, 
regularly writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review , was told 
to leave . Apparently he fell foul of the regime on many issues: 
his reports about the death-squads, about the policy clash 
between Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja and Armed 
Forces Commander General Benny Murdani on the question of 
Vietnam, and the recent arrest of dissidents in Jakarta. 
Early in December, Japan's leading daily, Asahi Shimbun, 
lost its correspondent in Jakarta. But unlike the four others who 
had been expelled "more politely" by not having their visas 
renewed, Akira Mori was ordered to leave within a week. 
According to an Information Department spokesperson, Mori 
had filed a report about the Armed Forces which contained "an 
error" as he quoted illegal leaflets considered to be subversive. 
There must have been a disagreement in official circles on how 
to deal with Mori. He told AFP that initially, he had been told 
that the government regarded his report as "insulting" but his 
visa was nevertheless renewed. Then suddenly he was 
summoned to the Information Department and told to leave . 
The expulsion of foreign journalists is intended as a warning 
to their papers or agencies. Whereas virtually all Australian 
news media are prohibited from any representation in Indonesia, 
other media have not been prevented from sending new 
correspondents in place of those thrown out. Murdani 
Murdani is "jittery" about 
journalists 
Asked recently by Reuters correspondent in Jakarta, Peter 
Millership, why foreign correspondents who have applied for 
permission to visit Ea&t Timor have been turned down, Murdani 
bluntly replied : "We are jittery with journalists." That sentiment 
is clearly not confined to East Tirrior affairs. 
apparently feels satisfied with his efforts to muzzle the foreign 
press for he said, after "addressing a meeting of the Indonesian 
Press Council (Indonesian Reports, December Log, page 17), 
that foreign reporting on Indonesia was now running parallel 
with the main lines of government policy. But he is at the same 
time having to muzzle his own bureaucrats. Australian Financial 
Review (14 November) reports that some government ministries 
have been warned by army security to avoid any contact with the 
foreign press. 
Private radios told: government news bulletins only 
Private radio stations scattered throughout the country are 
known to have a huge audience and have for years been required 
to devote 40% of their broadcast time to government-originated 
material. But in December, control on newscasting was 
tightened up when private stations were barred from 
broadcasting any news bulletins of their own and relay only news 
bulletins from Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI). As it is, 
according to the Jakarta branch of the Indonesian Private Radio 
Broadcasters Association (PRSSNI), they rely on official sources 
such as the Antara news agency, handouts from the Defence 
Department, provincial governors' offices, regional military 
commands and the police for compilation of their own news 
bulletins. The PRSSNI has urged the Information Minister to 
reconsider his latest restriction, saying that they could get this 
news out to their listeners much faster than RRI, and had proven 
this most recently with their reporting of the Tanjung Priok 
incident and the explosion at the Cilandak ammunition dump. 
Police intimidate journalists in North Sumatra 
Three journalists were arrested, three others fled for safety to 
Medan and one other went into hiding in the district of Padang 
Sidempuan, North Sumatra because the district police chief 
(kapolres) objected to media reporting of a pre-trial hearing in 
which police officers were being accused of unlawful arrest . 
The three arrested journalists were Jhonatan Siregar of 
Dobrak, Ali Rahman Nasution of Mercu Suar and Jaliluli 
.... 
.. 
.. 
... . 
Harahap of Mimbar Umum. The three who fled to report the 
arrests to the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) Medan 
branch and seek the protection of the Medan Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH) declared that they would not return home until they had 
assurances from the police that they would not be arrested. The 
journalist who went into hiding did so after receiving an 
intimidatory letter from the District Police Chief warning of 
"firm measures" if a police order for the pre-trial hearing not to 
be reported in the press was ignored. 
The reason for the police chiefs fury was that journalists had 
reported a pre-trial hearing in which the police were the accused. 
The police had ordered the journalists not to take photographs 
of their members on trial, but the journalists stuck by their right 
to publish photos as long as they had the permission of the 
presiding judge, which had indeed been granted. 
The arrest warrant for the three arrested journalists accused 
them of "creating ill-feeling" in the community, and linked this 
charge with their reports of the pre-trial hearing. Later, 
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however, when the case was given wide publicity not only in the 
media in North Sumatra but also in the national press, the 
district police issued new warrants claiming that they had formal 
criminal charges against the journalists. 
Sinar Harapan, which has given extensive coverage to this 
case , reported on 21 December that a number of journalists went 
to Padang Sidempuan to visit their detained colleagues . They 
confirmed that the arrests were an act of vengeance and had 
nothing to do with any criminal offence. The police chief 
responsible, Ansyar Roem, was quoted in the Medan press as 
saying: 
I've been under attack for more than two months with reports about 
the pre-trial hearings . Do journalists think they're a bunch of angels 
immune from the processes of the law? If they think they can be 
clever digging around for my mistakes and weaknesses , I'll show 
them I can be even cleverer , as they will soon find out. 
Sinar Harapan said Ansyar Roem had delivered these words 
with a great deal of emotion and added that, after months ~f 
being subjected to attacks from these journalists, it was now his 
turn to impose his authority , and he would not hesitate to do so 
as long as he wielded the necessary power. 
Journalists released 
Following the widespread publicity, the Police Chief of North 
Sumatra ordered Ansyar Roem to release the three men and 
place them under external detention (tahanan luar). The three 
who fled to Medan have also returned home. Even so, a fact-
finding mission set up by the PWI and LBH in North Sumatra 
decided to proceed with their investigations. One lawyer who 
has been following the case said this was a prime example of the 
abuse of power and the blinkered view of many officials about 
the role of the press. 
Source: Sinar Harapan, 17, 18, 21 and 26 December, and 3 
January 1985. 
Ali Sadikin challenges Murdani to 
a debate 
Lieutenant-General -(retired) Ali Sadikin. 
Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Benny Murdani 
used the occasion of a retirement banquet for 22 high-ranking 
officers on 30 October to make a blistering attack on retired 
senior officers who have publicly criticised the present military 
regime. The men he had in mind included General (ret.) 
Nasution, former Defence Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-
Staff, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Ali Sadikin, formerly 
commander of the Marine Corps (KKO) and Major-General 
(ret.) H.R. Dharsono, now under arrest, formerly Chief-of-Staff 
of the Siliwangi division, plus many others who have recently put 
their signatures to various critical documents now widely 
circulating inside Indonesia. 
Murdani described their criticisms as "unhealthy" and 
"unconstructive" and a betrayal of the results of the struggle 
pioneered "by our predecessors" . He warned the officers now 
going into retirement that as fighters and soldiers (pejuang 
prajurit) their struggle "must continue to the end of time". 
A quick response came from Ali Sadikin in an open letter, 
which has not the slightest chance of appearing in any 
publication inside Indonesia, challenging Murdani to a public 
debate. Ali Sadikin's response reads as follows: 
1) You are perfectly entitled to present your own assessment of 
some Armed Forces officers now in retirement. 
2) Likewise, we are entitled to declare that what we have done is 
intended to improve the image of the Armed Forces in the eyes 
of the public, in upholding justice in the Indonesian Republic as 
a state based on law with sovereignty in the hands of the people. 
3) I should add that there certainly are differences of opinion 
between Armed Forces officers . who are still active in 
government and some now in retirement concerning the general 
implementation of government and, more specifically, the role 
of the Armed Forces within the state. 
4) I believe that there is nothing catastrophic about differences 
of opinion. Such differences can even be a blessing if we express 
them constitutionally through formal and informal channels, 
resulting in well-directed and effective communication. 
5) The fact that these differences exist is widely known in 
society. Therefore, to ensure that they indeed become a 
blessing, I propose a nation-wide exchange of opinions between 
leading Armed Forces officers still active in government and 
those retired Armed Forces who hold different opinions. 
6) Such an exchange of opinions should be open and heart-to-
heart, and the best place would be at the Parliament Building or, 
in keeping with modem technology, on television. 
7) If we conduct this exchange of views as befits a mature nation 
which upholds national discipline, I feel convinced that . the 
people will greatly benefit. 
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Death-squads active again 
Organised army death-squads have become active again after a 
respite of several months. Six bodies were discovered in various 
parts of Jogjakarta, Central Java during December, all of them 
members of a well-known youth gang in the city. Tempo weekly, 
quoted in Volkskrant (18 January 1985), reported that the deaths 
were known to be the result of a new sweep against criminals. 
The journal quoted the military commander of Jogjakarta, 
Colonel Tuswandi as saying that the authorities were again 
launching a "security action" against hardened crimnals. "We 
are taking no risks with these criminals who continue to cause 
trouble and are always trying to escape." 
The army's death-squad drive against criminals in 1983 and 
1984 commenced in Jogjakarta as well; the Legal Aid Institute in 
Jakarta estimated that about four thousand people were shot 
dead or murdered in other ways up to the end of 1984. 
The new campaign comes only weeks after General Murdani 
told Reuters on 17 December that the Armed Forces had never 
given orders for criminals to be killed and denied that the many 
deaths of criminals since March 1983 were the result of an 
organised campaign. He did say however, that when he took 
over as commander of the armed Forces in March 1983, he found 
that the poiice were not doing a proper job in many areas: 
"So what we did-what I did, OK, I said it-I said: 'Be more 
firm. It is part of your job to protect this man. You protect him 
even if you have to pull the trigger.'" His explanation according 
to Reuters, was that this had resulted in Mafia-style gangs being 
driven out of their areas of influence into the territory of other 
gangs, sparking bloody gangland warfare. (Guardian, 18 
D~cember, 1984) Murdani apparently forgot to brief his 
subordinate in Jogja about what he told Reuters, so as to keep 
their stories consistent with each other. 
ASEAN Labour Ministers worried 
about "interference" 
Indonesia's Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, who was 
Commander of the security agency KOPKAMTIB, until early 
1983, intends to do everything possible to prevent international 
solidarity actions in support of Indonesian workers by 
international trade union organisations, which he regards as 
gross interference in Indonesia's internal affairs. 
His remarks came after a meeting of ASEAN Labour 
Ministers held in Manila on 8-9 October where the ministers had 
apparently compared notes about such "interference". He gave 
as one example the ILO's condemnation of Indonesia in the 
1970s for using political detainees as forced labour on the island 
of Buru. In Sudomo's eyes, the prison island where well over 
10,000 untried political prisoners were held for nearly a decade, 
working in arduous and extremely hazardous conditions without 
pay, was a "rehabilitation centre" preparing the prisoners for 
their return to society. 
Another solidarity campaign which had alarmed the ASEAN 
ministers, he said, was the Australian trade union boycott of 
MAS planes when pilots of the Malaysian airline were on strike 
in the late 1970s. "Indonesia almost encountered the same 
problem when (Garuda) pilots were making moves to join their 
international trade union." (Presumably, this was at the time 
Garuda pilots were on strike, not long after the MAS strike.) 
"But we prevented that", said Sudomo. "I was KOPKAMTIB 
Commander at the time." 
He said that data compiled by the ASEAN ministers would 
be submitted to the 10th meeting of Asian and Pacific Labour 
Ministers due to take place in Australia in January 1985. 
Finally on the right to strike in I~donesia, Sudomo .claimed 
the right was recognised, though qmckly added that smce the 
right has not yet been regulated by law (in fact it has), people 
should not think they can go ahead and exercise it. And what of 
these regulations when they come into force? Said Sudomo: 
"We're promoting a gotong-royong life-style, based on 
consensus. Strikes have no part in this framework because they 
are acts of violence." 
(Source: Merdeka, 15 October 1984) 
Dutch musicians abandon tour 
in protest 
The members of the internationally-renowned Netherlands 
Wind Ensemble cut short a tour of Indonesian cities last October 
in protest against the political overtones of the tour prQgramme. 
After a meeting with the Dutch ambassador in Jakarta, the 
Ensemble decided not to go ahead with a concert they were to 
have given in Bandung, and it was cancelled. The place chosen 
was a hall at a military academy, probably the Staff and 
Command School (SESKOAD), and most of the audience 
would have consisted of invitees from the Armed Forces. 
After an earlier concert in Jakarta, the musicians registered 
their protest at the political framework in which the concert had 
been set. Without prior consultation with the Ensemble, the 
Dutch Ambassador decided to link the concert with an official 
visit being made to Indonesia by a Dutch government minister. 
Initially, the musicians announced that they would not play but 
after discussion, decided to go ahead with the programme. When 
the announced programme was completed, the oboeist, Werner 
Herbers, introduced an encore with the following words: 
"We dedicate this piece to everyone and especially to all the 
artists-those who are free as welJ as those who aren't-in this 
beautiful country of Indonesia." 
Source: Volkskrant, 22 October 1984 
Societies' Law: 
Foreign Office reply 
In TAPOL Bulletin No.66, we published the correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and Lord A vebury, Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, regarding the new 
Societies Law now before the Indonesian Parliament. 
Richard Luce, Minister of State, sent the following reply to 
Lord Avebury on 23 November 1984. 
I have given careful consideration to your letters on this subject. Clearly, 
questions about the significance of the proposed legislation, the nature of 
the opposition to the Bills in Indonesia and the reasons behind the riots in 
Jakarta in September are matters of judgement on which different 
assessments are possible. I am, however, sure you would agree that it 
would be wrong for us to take issue with the proposed Bills which are the 
domestic legislation put forward by another country and, moreover, still at 
only the draft stage. Such action on our part could be interpreted as 
unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. 
That said, we are, as the record shows, willing to speak out against 
established cases of human rights abuse. We are well aware of the concern 
to which the Bills have given rise amongst certain groups both inside 
Indonesia and elsewhere and on this occasion I have asked our 
Ambassador discreetly to make known to the Indonesian authorities the 
concern which you, in your capacity as Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Human Rights Group, have expressed to me. We shall continue to follow 
developments closely. 
Lawyers barred from leaving Indonesia 
At least three human rights lawyers, all of them members of the 
Mubaligh/Political Cases Defence Team, have been barred from 
going abroad. They are T. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the YLBHI 
and of the Defence Team, H.C. Princen, chairman of the 
Human Rights Institute and Abdul Hakim, chairman of the 
Jakarta LBH. Mulya Lubis told AAP that the authorities had 
refused to grant exit permits, without giving any reason. 
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Indonesia's upside-down land refornt 
The Minister for Agriculture, Ir Achmad Affandi, announced a plan in August last.year to cut by half the number of pea~ants cultivating 
land of less than 0.5 hectares, and to work for the eventual elimination of all small-sized farms . The prog~ar:ime would be implemented, he 
said, "without compensation". The dispossessed farmers can transmigrate, move onto nucleus estates, ]Om other gov~rnment-sponsored 
programmes, amalgamate their plots, or whatever. "But in the end", he stressed, "farms of less than half a hectare must disappear; also those 
of less than a hectare." (Kompas, 20 August 1984.) 
In assessing the implications of this newly-
announced policy, we may first note that it 
represents a reversal of the land reform 
policies enacted in 1960, which still remain 
on the books even if never implemented, 
as a courageous editorial in the daily 
newspaper Merdeka reminds us: 
The abolition of farms--however small-
means the abolition of land ownership rights . 
According to our Basic Agrarian Laws , 
landless peasants and those whose land is too 
small must be given more land . . . and 
according to the same laws, those who own 
land in excess of what the law defines as 
appropriate must have part of their land 
taken away. Now, exactly the opposite is to 
happen: large landowners are to be left 
untouched , and those who own too little are 
to be done away with and dispossessed . Is 
this just and progressive (adil dan maju)? 
(Merdeka , 23/8/84) 
This idea of an "upside-down" land reform 
- in which land is taken away from the 
smallest peasants to create and strengthen 
a class of "middle" peasants - is in fact not 
absolutely new in Indonesian history. A 
similar policy was invented and 
implemented by the colonial government 
in the district of East Cirebon (Java) in the 
1920s; about one-fifth of the peasants 
holding shares in communal land in that 
district were dismissed without 
compensation and their land distributed 
among the others (those interested in these 
colonial reforms and their disastrous 
results may read the recent study by 
Professor Breman, 1983). 
Secondly , for those not well-acquainted 
with agrarian conditions in Indonesia, we 
may note that the policies outlined by 
Minister Affandi, if implemented , would 
not affect only a small minority of 
Indonesia's peasants but a rather large 
majority: at the time of the 1980 
Population Census (see Table 1 below) 
farms of less than 0.5 hectare represented 
almost two-thirds of all farms in Indonesia, 
and almost three-quarters of all farms in 
Java . 
Certainly , the existence of so many 
millions of tiny farms represents an 
enormous problem, particularly in Java 
where more than 60% of Indonesia's 
population of about 150 million live on 
about 7% of Indonesia's land area , with 
average population densities of about 700 
people per square kilometer which make it 
the most densely-populated agrarian 
region in the world. 
16 
TABLE I: 
Distribution of farm sizes among rural households, 
according to the 1980 Population Census 
Number (in millions) and percent of households: 
Farm size JAVA OTHER ISLANDS TOTAL 
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Less than 0.25 ha. 4.43 (43% ) 1.53 (21%) 5.96 (34%) 
0.25-0 .50 ha . 3.10 (30%) 1.96 (28%) 5.06 (29%) 
More than 0.50 ha . 2.83 (27%) 3.61 (51 % ) 6.44 (37%) 
Total "farm" households 10.36 (100%) 7.10 (100%) 17.46 (100%) 
Number of "agricultural 
wage labour households" 6.02 1.21 7.23 
Number of rural households 15 .19 8.91 24.10 
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik , Jakarta , P~nduduk Indonesia Menurut Propinsi (Seri L no 3), 1981 , Table 14 
(farm sizes) , Table 17 (agricultural wage labour households) ; Penduduk Indonesia (Seri S no 2), 1983, 
Table 60.2 (number of rural households). 
The "problem" of small farmers is not a 
problem of inefficiency in maximising the 
production of food or other agricultural 
products on a limited land area. In 
Indonesia as in many other third-world 
countries, it is the smallest farmers -
despite all their problems of lack of access 
to BIMAS credit and other services -who 
manage to achieve the highest per-hectare 
yields, as the data in Table 2 demonstrate. 
However, most of those commenting on 
Minister Affandi's plans have agreed that 
in general, farms of less than 0.5 ha. cannot 
provide the peasant household with a 
reasonable income. Professors I Bagus 
Teken and Guswono Supardi of Bogor 
Agricultural University commented that 
for a peasant with less than 0.5 ha. of 
irrigated land or 0.75 ha . of rainfed land, 
TABLE 2: 
"no matter what he does, his efforts on the 
farm cannot provide a reasonable standard 
of living. His income can increase, but it 
still can't support him", ' apart from 
exceptional cases like an orchid farm, "but 
how many farmers have the chance to 
cultivate a high-value commodity like 
that?" (Kompas, 28/8/84). M. Toha, 
chairman of the All-Indonesia Farmers' 
Association (HKTI) was only slightly more 
optimistic: farms of less than 0.5 ha. can be 
made more "effective" through rapid 
transfer of technology, but that requires a 
large investment which may not be feasible 
in Indonesia at present (Merdeka, 24/8/84). 
Some small farmers, in fact, have been 
able to achieve this kind of dramatic 
technical progress. The Australian 
researchers W. and S. Edmundson, 
Yield of padi sawah* according to area of *sawah holding (1975) 
Size of sawah holding Padi yield (tons per harvested hectare) 
Less than 0.25 ha. 
0.25-0.49 ha. 
0.50-0. 74 ha . 
0.75-1.49 ha . 
1.50--2.99 ha . 
More than 3.00 ha . 
Average 
JAVA 
4.4 
4.1 
4.0 
3.9 
3.7 
3.6 
4.0 
ALL INDONESIA 
4.3 
3.9 
3.8 
3.5 
3.3 
3.3 
3.7 
Source: Data from Biro Pusat Statistik, calculated by Keuning (1984, p.61) 
•sawah: riceland 
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revisiting a village in East Java which had 
been the site of a previous study, give the 
example of half-hectare rice farms which in 
1965 produced two crops per year and a 
total of 3.6 tons, while in 1983 three crops 
per year gave a total of 9.6 tons, "enough 
to feed six families at subsistence level" 
(Edmundson & Edmundson, 1983). More 
important, however, is that the production 
of a farm of 0.5 ha.-even of 0.2 or 0.1 
ha.-<:an provide a crucial part of a 
reasonable household income when 
combined with other activities. As many 
detailed village-level studies have shown 
during the 1970s, it is just this pattern of 
multiple income sources which provides 
the key to the survival of so many millions 
of tiny farms in Java. To estimate the 
minimum size of a "viable" farm, we 
should not only calculate what the land 
itself produces but add to that the income 
from chickens or ducks (and their eggs), a 
few sheep or goats and perhaps a cow or 
buffalo; the produce of the tiny but 
intensively-cultivated house-gardens (peka-
rangan); and the income from the many 
other activities of men, women and 
children, which may include handicrafts, 
part-time petty trading, and agricultural or 
non-agricultural wage-labour, which may 
involve the seasonal or "circular" out-
migration of one or more family members 
to Jakarta or another city. In short: nearly 
all of Java's "farmers" are already "part-
time" farmers. While this may not be a very 
"neat" state of affairs from the planners' 
point of view - for example, it makes 
conventional labour-force statistics on 
employment by sector, which record only 
one "occupation" per person, almost 
meaningless - it is an important part of 
the reality of Indonesian small-peasant 
survival strategies. 
TABLE 3: 
dismal, with the great proportion of non-
agricultural workforce having to seek 
employment in the already overcrowded 
"trade" and "services" sectors, both of 
which are characterised by very low 
incomes (Table 3) . 
What of the future? Population and 
labour-force projections made by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics and the World 
Percentage of employed persons by industry, Indonesia 1971-1980 
Industry 1971 1980 
(%) (%) 
1. Agriculture 64.2 54.8 
2. Mining & quarrying 0.2 0.7 
3. Manufacturing industry 6.5 8.5 
4. Electricity, Gas & Water 0.1 0.2 
5. Construction 1.6 3.1 
6. Trade 10.3 12.9 
7. Transport & communication 2.3 2.9 
8. Finance 0.2 0.4 
9. Services 10.0 15. I 
(Other/unstated) (4 .6) (1.4) 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik. A Brief Note on 1980 Population Census , Jakarta. 1982 p.47 
Manufacturing does not help absorb labour 
from the villages 
In Indonesia according to census statistics, 
some shift of the labour-force out of 
agriculture has been occurring during the 
1970s. However, the slow growth of 
manufacturing industry and its 
predominantly capital-intensive pattern of 
new investment have meant that the 
labour-absorption record of this sector is 
Bank agree that Indonesia's population 
will grow from 148 million in 1980 to about 
233 million in 2000; labour-force growth of 
2.5% per year is predicted until at least 
1990, which means for example that about 
1. 5 million extra people each year will be 
looking for work in the current (1984-
1989) Five Year Plan. Under these 
circumstances, we may doubt whether non-
agricultural sectors can absorb the annual 
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increase in the labour force, to say nothing 
of those millions of small-farm households 
whom Minister Affandi hopes to 
"encourage" to abandon their land by 
1989. As two recent analysts have noted: 
Labour-intensification in manufacturing, the 
most often mentioned solution, could not 
possibly be sufficient by itself in one plan 
period if only because the manufacturing 
sector is still so small, representing only 
8.4% of the labour force in 1980. Thus 
agriculture and services must continue to 
bear the largest share of the labour 
absorption burden, which implies that they 
must become even more labour-intensive or 
grow more rapidly . 
(Glassburner & Poffenberger, 1983, p.6)) 
Thus , in the foreseeable future, planners 
should not be thinking of solving the small-
farmer "problem" by throwing millions of 
households off their land into sectors which 
cannot ;:ibsorb them, but rather of throwing 
more state resources in the direction of the 
small farmers, to assist and strengthen 
their efforts to intensify small-scale 
production and labour-use , both on and off 
the farm . As M. Toha of the HKTI (see 
above) comments: "With no existing 
means of accommodating the labour force 
affected by this (planned) abolition of 
small farms, it will only create a new and 
difficult problem, that of increasing 
unemployment" (Merdeka, 24/8/84) . 
Perhaps the only element in Minister 
Affandi's plan which might be positively 
received is the idea of encouraging holders 
of small farm plots to amalgamate their 
tiny holdings and cultivate them jointly, 
with shared resources of land, labour and 
Continued on page 18 
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Land disputes 
Arined intiinidation used against peasants 
Pressure on working peasants to give up their land is a major 
source of injustice in Indonesia and is forcing more and more 
people into destitution. While the civilian and military 
authorities together with business interests work closely together 
to take possession of a highly profitable means of investment, 
the peasants have no democratic organisation to protect their 
interests against the armed might of local officialdom . 
The Legal Aid Institutes in Jakarta and other cities recently 
held a Seminar on land disputes. Sinar Harapan commented (17 
December 1984) that the discussions which were marked by a 
sense of despondency and gloom, heard a number of peasants 
speak about their own cases. 
4,000 peasant families driven from their land in Lampong 
A staggering 4,000 families have been ordered to quit land that 
they have been cultivating since 1975 in the village of Banding, 
Wonosobo Sub-District in Lampung District, South Sumatra . 
The village is composed basically of spontaneous transmigrants 
(not supported by government funding) from Central Java, and 
the dispute involves altogether 8,000 hectares of land which was 
originally forest land. The land was part of a much larger site 
handed out under a concession to a private company by the 
forestry department for exploitation in 1970. It was cleared but 
subsequently left unworked by the company, and was therefore 
ceded to the new settlers who proceeded to plant coffee bushes 
and clove trees . Since then, the plantations have provided the 
peasants with a sizable income. 
The forestry department has now decreed however that the 
land should never have been cleared and has designated it as 
"protected forest-land", as a result of which all the trees and 
bushes now in a thriving state of production must be destroyed, 
even though some officials have conceded that the trees and 
bushes planted can also perform the function of protecting the 
soil. 
The peasants feel particularly bitter because they are now 
accused of "land-grabbing" even though the forestry authorities 
authorised their acquisition of the land in 1975, and made no 
objections. As "land-grabbers", the peasants have been told that 
they are entitled to no compensation at all, either for the land or 
for the trees and bushes that they are now being told they should 
never have planted. The peasants have also complained about 
Continued on from page 17 
the intimidation used by the local authorities to force them to 
leave the land. 
One peasant murdered and six more disappear 
Six peasants disappeared from their homes last July and have not 
been heard of since, after being summoned by the local army to 
give evidence about the murder of a peasant. The families of the 
six men have been living in a state of fear ever since the 
disappearances and are too afraid to remain in their own homes. 
Kompas, (8 November), reporting the disappearances, said the 
men's village, Harjokuncaran, Malang District in East Java, is 
gripped by fear. 
The villager who was murdered was named Sinem, and the 
murder occurred as the result of a land dispute involving the 
village head. The six men had been witneseses to the murder, 
and it is apparently the local authorities who have "spirited" the 
men away. Many people in the village saw Sinem being cold-
bloodedly hacked to death, defending his land. He is, according 
to Kompas, not the only victim to have fallen in the course of this 
dispute. In 1979 another villager died in an "accident" believed 
to have been deliberately set up to intimidate the peasants. 
The precise details of the land dispute are not clear, but it 
appears that Sinem, together with other peasants, was the 
beneficiary of a land distribution decision that has been 
challenged by the local authorities. He was working on his land 
despite warnings that he should not do so. 
The disappearance of the six men has been strongly 
condemned by a number of human rights lawyers in Jakarta, 
who accuse the authorities of failing to provide security and 
protection for villagers involved in land disputes. T. Mulya 
Lubis, chairman of the national Legal Aid Institute Foundation 
(YLBHI) said he was convinced that an organised crime ring was 
being used by people in authority to intimidate villagers. He was 
aware of several cases similar to the one that has now come out 
into the open in Harjokuncaran. 
In December, the police chief of the Sub-Area Command in 
Malang objected to people saying the six had "disappeared". 
They had simply "not returned home" he said, and claimed that 
one of them was in Surabaya. Kompas said that a team of 
officials from the police, the military and the prosecutor's office 
has been formed to find the men . 
capital. But, it may be asked, how far will 
the state permit the emergence of small-
scale collective enterprises, when at 
present the only permitted form of formal 
agricultural cooperation is the "Village 
Unit Cooperative" (KUD), an organisation 
whose domination by wealthy farmers and 
corrupt officials is an open secret? As 
Merdeka's editors enquired: 
transferring their land-rights to a small 
majority of better-off farmers, we hope 
that the small farmers and other concerned 
Indonesians will be given the chance to 
say: "Thanks, but no thanks!" 
If the small farmers are to be amalgamated, 
will this amalgamation be done through the 
peasant arisan system or small-scale 
traditional cooperatives (i .e . through small, 
autonomous forms of traditional peasant 
cooperation-red.), or will they be sucked 
into the KUD system? 
(Merdeka, 23/8/84) 
While visiting state agricultural research 
centres in 1984, Minister Affandi has often 
told the agricultural researchers that their 
target must be to increase the average 
income of Indonesia's farmers to 2500 US 
dollars per year. A commendable goal . . . 
but if it is to be achieved by "abolishing" 
the large majority of · small farmers a·nd 
18 
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Book reviews 
The writer who wasn't 
1neant to survive 
Child of All Nations by Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer, Penguin, 1984 
It is not often that a novel gives me such 
deep pleasure . It is not a pleasure that 
derives from being amused or entertained, 
but one of political hope. For what 
Pramoedya reveals in this book, far more 
than its predecessor in the quartet, (This 
Earth of Mankind, Penguin, 1982) is how 
well he has survived the vicious oppression 
that was meted out to him. And if he has, 
then perhaps others of the many thousands 
of political prisoners incarcerated for so 
long in Indonesia during the 1960s-70s 
have done so too. 
Through the central characters of 
Minke, a budding journalist from the 
Javanese aristocracy, and his mother-in-
law Nyai Ontosoroh, sold as a concubine 
but now a successful businesswoman, 
Pramoedya unravels the oppression of the 
Dutch colonial system in Java. The time is 
the 1890s and "Lord Sugar", that most 
profitable and exploitative of colonial 
export crops, reigns. Minke learns to break 
out of feudal and colonial structures to 
listen to those beneath him, peasants and 
women included, to hear just how the 
colonial system translates into misery for 
the mass of the people. But his attempts to 
publicise their plight flounder, for sugar 
interests also control information. · 
Through contact with a young 
nationalist from mainland China, he hears 
for the first time that other peoples, the 
Chinese, the Filipinos, are in revolt. He 
realises that he has so much to learn, and 
from sources which his privileged Outch 
education had led him least to expect. 
"This modern age had provided many 
breasts to suckle me - from among the 
Natives themselves, from Japan, China, 
America, India, Arabia, from all the 
peoples on t.he face of this earth . . . In 
humility, I admitted: I was a child of all 
nations, of all ages, past and present. Place 
and time of birth, parents, all were 
coincidence: such things were not sacred ." 
and today's "New Order" in reality will be 
as clear as a bell . 
The Indonesian military government 
has spent many years trying to stamp out 
dissent, and unfortunately has been far too 
successful. Now along comes a quartet of 
books, available to the popular reader , 
which tackles suppression head on. Little 
wonder, then, that the series is banned 
inside Indonesia, and copies have been 
seized and burnt. They even succeeded. in 
getting the translator of the books into 
English, Max Lane, sent home from his 
post in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. 
But the fury of the Indonesian 
govemment must also run deep against 
Pramoec,iya himself. precisely because he 
was not meant to survive, as a writer, as a 
politica) being, as a political writer. For 
many long years on the prison island of 
Bum he was denied writing equipment. 
Later, when he was granted the tools, his 
manuscripts were seized. But he didn 't 
succumb. At first he developed his stories 
by telling them to his fellow prisoners ; 
later, when international pressure had 
made the prison authorities allow him to 
write, the other inmates took on his share 
of the forced labour to give him time to 
write, a remarkable example of solidarity. 
The fruits of those years are what we are 
now seeing in these and other new 
publications. 
We know that many of those 
incarcerated did not survive in good shape , 
physically and/or psychologically , and now 
live cut-off, tending towards hopelessness 
and apathy. We cannot berate them, for 
they suffered greatly. But clearly there are 
others, including Pramoedya and Jusuf 
Ishak, his fellow inmate and publisher of 
the Indonesian version of these books , who 
not only came out alive but ready to kick 
too . 
There seems to be something very 
crucial about those years of isolated 
comradeship on Bum. To me it is no 
coincidence that the author and the 
publisher of this work of dissent , one of the 
most important in Indonesia in recent 
years, are former political prisoners. The 
irony seems to be that while the mass of the 
Indonesian population had the political 
stuffing knocked out of them through 
massive exercises in manipulation and 
propaganda , some, perhaps many, of those 
Letter to the Editor 
I am grateful to T APOL Bulletin for 
reviewing my Sawito thesis (No .66 , 
November 1984). There is however, one 
important point made by Carmel 
Budiardjo in the review which I must 
respond to . I did not state that the Head of 
the ABRI Fraction in Parliament Major 
General Domo Pranoto "died at the hands 
of army security" . I referred only (in a 
footnote) to "unsubstantiated rumours 
circulated at the time" that this was the 
case . 
With reality 
exaggeration? 
as it is, who needs 
Yours , 
David Bourchier 
behind bars kept their ideas intact. 
This is primarily why I enjoyed the book 
so much . But there are other reasons . In 
this second book the character Annelies 
died, and frankly it was a relief. Annelies 
spent most of the first volume unable to 
overcome the desperat.e situation into 
which the racist colonial system had put 
Continued on page 20 
It is this sense of enquiry, and of the 
universality of human experience, which 
make this book such a breath of fresh air. 
Pramoedya is encouraging his readers to 
look and listen all around them, to 
challenge received wisdoms, to form 
opinions. Sometimes the point seems a bit 
belaboured, as Minke struggles to 
comprehend so many new points of view. 
But the overall message is there: be brave 
enough to listen, especially to those 
without power, and have the courage to 
resist those with power. To Indonesian 
people, well versed in the interpretation of 
metaphor, the correspondences between 
challenging the colonial order in the book 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer with Max Lane, the translator of his 
books. 
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Borobudur nionunient and Solo Kraton 
attacked 
One of Indonesia's main tourist attractions, the Borobudur 
Temple in Central Java which is the largest Buddhist monument 
in the world, was the target of a bomb attack on the night of 20-
21 January. This is the latest in a series of actions thought to have 
been launched by Muslim dissidents in their efforts to express 
protest against government policy and undermine the army's 
security operations. 
Nine stupas were badly damaged by explosives and another 
two bombs failed to go off. 
The monument, set up during the golden era of the Sailendra 
Buddhist empire, took nearly a century to build, from 774 to 864 
AD, and cost many thousands of lives. After elaborate 
restoration in the 19th century by the Dutch, Borobudur was 
again subjected to a major restoration programme which lasted 
14 years and was undertaken under UNESCO supervision at a 
cost of some $50 millions. One-fifth of the cost was contributed 
by Japan, while many West European countries also made 
contributions. Together with the restoration, a Japanese-
financed Tourist Park (Taman Wisata) was built, encroaching on 
much of the land surrounding the monument and leading to the 
compulsory eviction of hundreds of peasant families. Victims of 
these evictions waged a determined struggle for many years to 
protect their rights (see TAPOL Bulletin No.54, November 1982 
for a detailed report of the campaign). 
The monument covers an area of 117 by 117 meters and rises 
in nine elaborately decorated terraces to a height of 40 metres. 
The terraces contain stone relief all the way round. There are 
altogether 72 stupas, each of which contains an image of the 
Buddha. 
Although no one has claimed responsibility for the attack, it 
is likely to have been intended as a protest against the many 
Muslim trials now under way and to warn the government that 
Continued from page 19 
opposition has not been halted by the many arrests and other 
security operations since the Tanjung Priok massacre last 
September. 
President Suharto's response has been to accuse the 
perpetrators of lacking in "national pride" . The Minister for 
Education and Culture, Nugroho Notosusanto, the army's 
official historian, has meanwhile denied that the attack has any 
religious significance. He claimed that the monument had long 
ceased to be a place of worship and was regarded simply as a 
world-famous historical monument. 
Stop Press 
All the buildings of the kraton (palace) of Solo was 
destroyed by fire on 1 February. The kraton is a bastion of 
Javanese feudal culture in Central Java, and the home of Mrs 
Suharto. The choice of Borobudur and the kraton as targets 
suggests that the Suharto regime's Javanese cultural roots are 
coming under attack, though whether from Muslims or 
disaffected Army circles, or a combination, is difficult to assess. 
herself, her mother and her lover, other 
than by swooning for long periods. Is this 
character drawn from Pramoedya's real 
life? Even if so, within the context of the 
book itself Annelies seem& highly 
improbable. For her mother, Nyai 
Ontosoroh, is a strong woman with an 
acute analysis of her situation and a life 
strategy worked out to deal with it. It 
seemed truly implausible that this woman, 
who teaches the young Minke so much 
about developing a critical awareness and 
then daring to act on it, would tolerate 
such a doll of a daughter. Not having to 
confront this major flaw of the first book I 
could sit back and enjoy Nyai Ontosoroh 
herself, marvelling at Pramoedya's 
courage, rare for a man anywhere but 
especially in the Indonesian context, to 
give such an instrumental role to a woman 
character. 
for his fellow Indonesians, but perhaps 
Penguin could have persuaded Max Lane 
to concentrate less on absolute faithfulness 
to the original text and open the books up 
more to the international readership. Some 
of the Indonesian and Dutch words 
retained in the text could have been 
translated without loss of authenticity or 
atmosphere, and not all of them are 
explained in the glossary. But all 
congratulations to Penguin for taking on 
the publication of the English translations, 
giving Pramoedya the light of day he is 
denied inside his own country. Personally, 
I can't wait for the next volume. 
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I must also add that this second book 
seemed to flow much better. I had 
difficulties with the style of the first. I don't 
know whether this was due to the original 
text or to the translation. However, a 
better rhythm had been found by the 
second volume. 
It crosses my mind to wonder what will 
be made of these books by readers not 
familiar with Java and its colonial past. 
Clearly the author was writing primarily 
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